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THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
GERMAN WELFARE STATE: 
POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
Meredith Abrams1 
Introduction 
The German welfare state is one of the most 
comprehensive in the world. It is a huge safety 
net, one that encompasses all citizens and pro-
vides them with benefits rarely matched by other 
countries. Health care is provided universally. 
Pensions are protected with a vengeance by polit-
icalleaders who value them as a key to re-elec-
tion. Unemployment compensation is so gener-
ous that some citizens find they receive almost 
the same income on the dole that they would if 
they had a job. This system, as the Germans are 
now realizing, may be too generous to survive. 
I begin this paper with a brief review of the 
evolution of Germany's welfare state in an 
attempt to explain why this system is so integral 
to modern German politics. I review the major 
1The author wishes to thank Professor Donald Barry of 
Lehigh University for helpful comments. 
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political parties and discuss their views of the 
welfare state and the improvements that each 
suggests. I point out the fact that most of the 
elected officials are trying hard to avoid the dif-
ficult decisions involved because they fear that 
any long term solution will cause too much short 
term pain for the voting public. I also discuss 
the most important aspects of the social system, 
concentrating on problem areas and proposals 
that have been suggested to resolve them. 
Finally, I analyze the impact of the problems of 
the welfare state on the German political system. 
The Early Beginnings of the Welfare 
State 
In the late 1800s Otto von Bismarck became 
the first leader to unite the many German states 
and place them under one empire. A political 
conservative, he was also the first European 
leader to support a comprehensive scheme of 
social security. His plan offered the worker insur-
ance against accident, sickness, and old age. This 
Bismarckian "socialism" later became a model 
for most of Europe. ("Bismarck," p. 719) Many 
aspects of his original plan are still intact in mod-
ern Germany. Although there were several rea-
sons attributed to his establishment of the wel-
fare state, one pressing influence was competition 
with the party of the Social Democrats. 
("Bismarck," p. 719) Germany's modern conser-
vative party, the Christian Democrats, is also cur-
rently fighting the Social Democrats over the 
future of the welfare state. 
The Christian Democrats 
The Christian Democratic Union/Christian 
Social Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SOP) are the two main parties of the 
German electoral system. To understand each 
party's background, it has been said that at 
party meetings the SPD favors beer to the CDU's 
fine wine. (Ash, p. 20) Having been in power 
for the past 15 years, the CDU and its leader, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, have set the tone for 
the recent restructuring of the welfare state. 
The CDU is a conservative, nationalistic 
party. The platform focuses on social market 
economic principles, providing "a sort of capi-
talism with a heart." ("The Party System ... " 
p. 87) Germany's "social market" economy is 
based on free market principles; but labor, wage 
and regulatory issues are largely decided by a 
broad consensus of government, business, and 
labor. (Germany, 1998) In keeping with the 
social market theory, Kohl's plans for change 
have not been drastic. As a modern conserva-
tive leader, he is often compared to former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 
former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, though 
Kohl is said to be much less radical in his 
approach to the welfare problem. ("German 
Unemployment...") Instead of drastically reduc-
ing social benefits, Kohl's plans have been an 
attempt to form a compromise between the 
demands of society and the limits of state fund-
ing. In 1996 he established a 50 point plan as a 
means of increasing labor market flexibility, 
reducing taxes, and cutting expenditures on 
entitlement programs. (Germany, 1998) But 
even this cautious plan was stalled in the legis-
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lature and in the social arena. Germany still has 
the shortest work week of any industrialized 
country, the longest vacations, the highest 
industrial wages, the oldest students and the 
youngest pensioners. (Murphy) Debt and unem-
ployment are high, and the cost of bringing the 
former East up to modern standards has been a 
staggering blow to the German economy. 
The CDU has been able to retain power in 
subsequent elections after the reunification, but 
many believe that the party's hold is weaken-
ing. Kohl and other party leaders are faced with 
a most uncomfortable situation. The excite-
ment of unification did not last long: reality set 
in as soon as the Christian Democrats realized 
they were faced with the difficulty of rebuilding 
East Germany's economy. (Conradt, p. 90) To 
retain power the CDU must keep the people 
happy, which means few reductions in social 
benefits. But unless they are willing to allow 
Germany to go bankrupt, the CDU must pass 
and enforce legislation to restructure the sacred 
welfare state. 
The CDU still believes that the current sys-
tem can be salvaged. German Labor Office pres-
ident Bernhard Jagoda suggests that by the year 
2000 Germany could create two million jobs if 
wages were to keep steady with the rate of infla-
tion. In addition, about 40 percent of current 
German overtime hours would have to be con-
verted into new jobs. (Boudette) The CDU also 
plans to reduce social security contributions to 
40 percent of gross wages (shared equally by 
employees and employers) in 2001, down from 
42 percent in 1997. Critics such as Larson 
Flemming, Deputy Director of Research at the 
International Monetary Fund, argue that the 
only way to do this is through a reform of the 
pension system, a reform not likely to pass 
through the consensus government. 
The CDU has found it extremely difficult 
to act on any proposals it brings to Parliament. 
When it does try to implement change, the pow-
erful German labor unions usually get angry. 
For instance, in April1996 Kohl proposed a $33 
billion cut in public spending in exchange for 
government support for a job creation program. 
But union leaders were outraged and refused to 
cooperate. (Templeman, p. 60) In the past, 
unions were not very concerned about job cre-
ation for their members because unemploy-
ment benefits in Germany were extremely gen-
erous. As a result, they were free to fight tooth 
and nail for increased wages for union mem-
bers. In 1996, however, tighter economic situ-
ations forced labor unions to face reality. The 
unions accepted smaller or no real wage 
increases later that year and again in 1997. It 
appears that threats by industries to move out 
of Germany have sparked fear in the unions, 
forcing them to be more compromising. Labor 
unions have also allowed firms to drop out of 
employer associations so that they are no longer 
bound by the industry-wide terms of employ-
ment. (Germany, 1998) 
The Social Democrats 
The CDU's strongest political rival is the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD). The SPD has 
traditionally had strong ties to labor unions, but 
it has also tried to extend its following to 
include middle-class voters by adopting a more 
flexible party platform. (Hancock, p. 82) In 
1989 the SPD established itself as a "catch-all" 
party. Its goal is to be viewed as a party with 
broad electoral appeal, catering particularly to 
unions and to the working class. The SPD has 
made a conscious effort to move toward the 
middle of the electoral spectrum in the hopes 
of attracting more voters and with the goal of 
taking power in the Fall1998 election. 
Having been out of power for the past 15 
years, the SPD has had the chance to criticize 
proposals for welfare restructuring imple-
mented by the CDU, without having to enact 
proposals of its own. Joining with the power-
ful German unions in opposing the CDU spend-
ing package announced in 1996, the SPD, 
which controls the upper house of Parliament, 
is expected to finish out the 1990s continuing 
to reject any steps intended to trim the welfare 
state. (McCathie) The SPD has managed so far 
to stay away from any real commitment to 
change. If it does gain power in the fall of 1998, 
it will be forced to test its own ideas. In the 
meantime, however, the party is able to sit back 
and criticize while only occasionally offering 
minimal suggestions. 
Because of its union ties, the SPD has con-
centrated most of its attention on the unem-
ployment aspect of the welfare state. Oskar 
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Lafontaine, a leading figure in the SPD party, 
has accused the government of "seeking to sac-
rifice Germany's welfare state to globalization." 
(Norman, p. 2) His argument is that the CDU 
has been willing to reduce the number of avail-
able jobs in order to encourage business invest-
ment. Rudolf Scharping, parliamentary leader 
of the SPD, also argues that the CDU has not 
done enough to reduce unemployment levels. 
In an interview with the Berliner Zeitung, 
Scharping said, "The jobless rate could swiftly 
be cut by reducing the massive number of over-
time hours being worked, by stricter measures 
to cut the number of illegal aliens working in 
Germany, and by boosting part-time jobs." 
("Jobless Record ... ") He pointed out that in 
1996 Germans worked a record 1.8 billion 
hours of overtime. Scharping argued that "cut-
ting this figure would create 300,000 to 400,000 
new jobs." ("Jobless Record ... ") 
Critics in the CDU counter this proposal 
with the argument that cutting overtime hours 
will drastically reduce salaries of many of the 
Germans who are already employed. The CDU 
concedes that there is an excess of overtime 
wages, but it has been unable to enact a policy 
aimed at solving the problem. One of the CDU's 
biggest obstacles is union protest to any reduc-
tion to the salaries of employed Germans. 
Another proposal offered by the SPD to combat 
the increasing jobless rate involves reducing the 
rate of social welfare contribution required for 
corporations and cutting taxes for middle and 
low-income employees and people with fami-
lies. ("German Unemployment...") 
One major difficulty the SPD party faces is 
the determination of leadership. An internal 
party battle has raged within the SPD since 1995. 
In November of that year the party dismissed its 
1994 candidate for chancellor, Rudolf Scharping, 
and returned to its 1990 candidate, Oskar 
Lafontaine. ("Five-Year Political...") More recent-
ly, Gerhard Schroeder has been gaining in pop-
ularity in the SPD and in the country at large. 
The fight over control of the party has led to pub-
lic dispute and possible division in the party. 
Because of the socialist victory in England in the 
mid-1990s, analysts predict that if the party lead-
ership is decided before the 1998 election, the 
SPD has a very legitimate chance of gaining con-
trol for the first time in over a decade. 
The German Welfare State 
The welfare state is politically important 
because it involves social benefits that are 
ardently supported by many German voters. 
The German welfare state was built around the 
four pillars of unemployment insurance, acci-
dent insurance, health care, and pensions. In 
1995 a fifth pillar was established, one which 
covers long term care for the elderly. The sys-
tem is funded by payroll contributions that are 
divided into a wide range of dedicated insurance 
funds administered by both employees and 
employers. (Suzman, p. 2) As a result, Germany, 
like the United States, suffers the problem of 
"paying today's contributions to yesterday's 
workers." (Suzman, p. 2) And again like the 
United States, there is considerable doubt 
among the German people about the future 
promises of the welfare state. (Protzman) 
As is true with most modern industrial-
ized nations, Germany suffers from limited 
resources. Because the system is so generous, 
many analysts look to the welfare state as the 
first and most obvious area for possible spend-
ing reductions in the German economy. Over 
the past 50 years the government has vastly 
increased its welfare budget, rising from 27 per-
cent of total public spending in 1950 to 47 per-
cent in 1994. ("No Escape" p. 5) Unless drastic 
reform takes place in the near future, the share 
of public spending devoted to the welfare state 
could rise above 50 percent in the near future. 
In 1995 Germany's non-wage labor costs 
accounted for about 45 percent of total hourly 
labor costs. Non-wage labor costs are the sup-
plements added to an employee's hourly wage 
which are used to cover his social benefits. This 
is an extremely high percentage, demonstrated 
by the fact that non-wage labor costs in 
Germany are five times those of Portugal, twice 
those of Spain and Britain, and 60 percent above 
those in the United States. (Stelzer, p. 16) As a 
consequence, many firms, including Mercedes 
Benz, BMW, Hugo Boss, and Siemens, are leav-
ing Germany to find less expensive labor else-
where. Though the political coalitions in power 
acknowledge the problem, they appear unwill-
ing to risk the votes necessary to make real 
change. Neither the government's proposed tax 
cuts nor the SPD's counterproposals promise 
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any radical change. Despite the current crisis, 
it is highly unlikely that there will be a signifi-
cant shift away from Germany's welfare-orient-
ed, social market economy. (Mangasarian) 
The problem with the welfare state did not 
become a crisis until after the reunification in 
1989. The costs associated with the reunifica-
tion have been a huge drain on the German 
economy. West Germany has spent more 
money bringing the former East up to the stan-
dards of the West than was spent implementing 
the Marshall Plan for Germany's WWII recon-
struction. West Germany transferred about 
$108 billion in 1995, an amount equivalent to 
about 40 percent of Eastern Germany's GDP. 
Aid granted by the Marshall Plan in the late 
1940s, by contrast, averaged less than 2 percent 
of West Germany's annual output during that 
time period. ("Eastern Germany ... ," p. 21) 
Although admittedly expensive, it is not mere-
ly the cost of reunification that is troubling the 
welfare system. The problems in Germany's 
welfare state began well before East and West 
united in 1989. While other Western nations 
began to trim back state benefits during the 
1980s, Germany instead offered all its previous 
benefits as a welcome-back present to the newly 
reunited East. Had the Germans used the 
reunification as an opportunity to restructure 
their welfare state rather than to expand it, the 
crisis might have been avoided. As it is now, 
government tax revenues are falling short of 
what is required, while demand for social ben-
efits only grows larger. (CNN Newsroom) 
Unemployment 
" 
A significant portion of German govern-
ment taxes is immediately absorbed by German 
unemployment benefits. Unemployment is 
understandably one of Germany's gravest con-
cerns. The jobless rate is expected to hover 
around 11.5 percent in 1998, meaning that 
almost 4~ million eligible German workers will 
not have jobs. ("Euro Zone ... ") The unemploy-
ment rate was higher in 1997 than it was in the 
summer of 1933, right after Hitler came to 
power. (Gimson, p. 10) CDU Labour Office pres-
ident Bernhard Jagoda admits that there is a cri-
sis, and is asking for urgent governmental action 
to combat unemployment. ("German Unemploy-
ment. .. ") In order to reduce Germany's unem-
ployment levels, many experts estimate that the 
country will need sustained GOP growth at a rate 
above 2.5 percent. Unfortunately this does not 
seem likely to happen, as real growth for 1997 is 
estimated at somewhere between 2 - 2.5 percent. 
("Germany: 1998 ... ") 
One reason why real growth cannot occur 
at the necessary levels is that the German 
unemployment insurance system is so gener-
ous. In 1994, an unemployed man with two 
children received benefits totaling about 71 per-
cent of his previous income; in the United 
States, the comparable figure is 55 percent. 
("No Escape," p. 5) For many Germans, there 
is little incentive to give up their unemploy-
ment benefits. In 1996 a married worker with 
two children in a low income job would earn a 
monthly gross salary of about $1,810 a month. 
According to the Bundesbank, after deducting 
tax and welfare insurance and adding child and 
other benefits, take-home pay would be about 
$1655. If instead of working she claimed unem-
ployment benefits, she would lose approxi-
mately three dollars, receiving a monthly 
income from the government of about $1652. 
("Germany: German Lower House ... ") High 
marginal tax rates (75-90 percent) also act as a 
deterrent to unemployed Germans returning to 
work. Moreover, most of Germany's unem-
ployment benefits and social assistance pro-
grams have no time restrictions. As a result, 
long term unemployment (12 months or 
longer) was 48.3 percent in 1995, as compared 
to only 9.5 percent the same year in the United 
States. (Larson) 
More and more Germans in this situation 
are consequently opting to leave their jobs and 
take the unemployment benefits. This unwill-
ingness to work can also be attributed to the 
refusal of many Germans to accept menial jobs. 
Experts argue that there is room for job cre-
ation in the underdeveloped service sector, but 
also concede that most Germans would shun 
the kind of low-wage service jobs that this type 
of expansion would offer. (Protzman) The argu-
ment persists that one reason so many Germans 
are out of work is that they are simply no longer 
willing to work hard. They claim that the sys-
tem of high unemployment benefits under-
mines the self-reliance and willingness to work 
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once displayed by the unemployed. (Mares, 
p. 24) Many believe that Germany's generous 
unemployment benefit system, which func-
tioned well during the post World War II indus-
trial period, cannot continue in a nation that 
seems to have lost its innate desire to work. 
What is more, the drastic changes that 
have occurred in Germany in the years since 
reunification have resulted in the loss of many 
jobs. According to a report issued by the 
Federal Statistics Office, Germany lost a total 
of 504,000 jobs during 1996. One-fourth of 
those losses were in Eastern Germany. 
("German Unemployment...") This has been an 
ongoing problem, as the report also cites a loss 
of over two million jobs over the previous five 
year period. Germany's long time Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, recently pledged to "cut the job-
less rate in half by the year 2000" ("German 
Unemployment..."), a promise most Germans 
do not believe he will be able to keep. Warnings 
about future unemployment continue to pour 
in, and most analysts agree that this situation 
is only likely to worsen in the near future. 
The unemployment statistics become 
more frightening when one realizes the huge 
amounts of money being spent on those with-
out work in Germany. Keep in mind that the 
generous welfare system leaves those without 
jobs often without worry since many of the ben-
efits last for an indefinite period. Although this 
knowledge may calm the fears of those about to 
lose work, with fewer people employed the rev-
enue coming into the system is steadily declin-
ing. More is being required of a system that is 
receiving less and less revenue. The increase 
in unemployment benefits has also been a 
major contributor to the slower rate of real GOP 
growth in Germany. ("Germany, 1998 ... ") 
The costs associated with unemployment 
insurance were not seen as a major problem 
during the initial stages of reunification. The 
working people in the East paid the same per-
centage of their income to the welfare state as 
those in the West. Because their income was 
less, fewer revenues were paid to the social 
security system in the East. This was not antic-
ipated to be a problem, however, because as 
benefits are related to income levels, social 
security expenditures in the East were expect-
ed to be lower too. Expectations were severely 
lowered, however, when it was realized that at 
the beginning of the reunification there was a 
deficit in the East's social security system. In 
the past, the administrators in the East were a 
few months behind in their payments. When 
the nation reunited, funds were insufficient to 
meet obligations. Additionally, it was decided 
that future revenues should be collected 
through tax revenue offices. This might have 
been a poor decision in light of the fact that 
there was no well developed tax revenue system 
in Eastern Germany prior to reunification. 
(Cornelsen, p. 230) Deficits increased rapidly, 
and the transition was not nearly as smooth as 
had been anticipated. 
This problem is especially alarming since 
the overhaul of most German businesses in the 
East resulted in huge declines in employment. 
Under the previous communist system, every-
one had a job, whether or not the work was 
actually productive. But now that the East 
functions under a capitalist system, the only 
jobs available are those that the market con-
siders necessary. For example, one machine 
factory in the East used to employ over 10,000 
people, but bankruptcy and the streamlining of 
the formerly communist run industry brought 
that number down to a few hundred. (CNN 
Newsroom) This sad story is repeated all over 
the former East. 
Female workers have found it more diffi-
cult than males to find new jobs in the East. 
The unemployment rate in the East for women 
is double that for men. ("Eastern Germany ... " 
p. 22) Most women held jobs under the com-
munist reign and grew accustomed to viewing 
their job as a way to contribute to society. 
Under the new capitalist system, companies 
have found it easier to offer the few jobs avail-
able to men, perhaps because it is assumed that 
it is the male who carries the responsibility of 
supporting the family. Many women who have 
a true desire to work, not to mention experi-
ence in the workforce, are essentially cut out of 
the current job market. 
Creating new jobs to replace those lost in 
the scramble of reunification is the easiest solu-
tion for many of these problems, but new job 
creation has not been a strong point of the 
German economy over the past 20 years. 
(Protzman) Some experts have concluded that 
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it is time for drastic change in the structure of 
the German economy. Claus Offe, Director of 
the Center for Social Policy at the University of 
Bremen, agrees. As he argues, "The fact is that 
many of these jobs are gone forever. The ques-
tion for social policy is no longer how do we get 
full employment, but how do we organize a 
society in which working is normal but a large 
segment of the society has no work." 
(Protzman) But a real drive for change cannot 
be found anywhere in the near political future. 
Neither party seems willing to take the chal-
lenge and offer a plan for real change. 
Health Care 
Another generous aspect of the German 
Welfare State is the health care system, which 
guarantees comprehensive benefits to all. 
These benefits come regardless of ability to pay. 
(Murphy) Almost every claim of medical need 
is generously met. Premiums are based on an 
individual's income and are paid for through 
mandatory payroll deductions. Risk profiles do 
not play a role in how much the individual is 
asked to pay. (Schmid) Everyone is promised 
health care, and the government pays for a very 
large percentage of medical bills. 
Comprehensive health care was empha-
sized in both former East and West Germany 
and is still considered a crucial part of the com-
prehensive welfare state. However, there were 
some differences between the two states in the 
care offered before reunification. In Eastern 
Germany the entire burden of health care had 
fallen on the government; all benefits were paid 
by the social security system beginning with the 
first day of illness. In the West, in contrast, 
some of the responsibility falls upon employers. 
Costs associated with the first six weeks of sick-
ness are covered by the employer; after that the 
social insurance system takes over. As of 
January 1991, the Eastern half of Germany 
adapted to the Western style of health care. 
(Cornelsen, p. 227-28) 
Despite the contributions of the employers 
and employees, the cost of the system is a con-
siderable drain on the German welfare state. 
Many experts argue that one effective way of 
reducing Germany's welfare state is to cut health 
benefits, but there is much disagreement as to 
which benefits should be reduced. Health care 
reforms have been successful in the past. For 
example, in 1993 restrictions on doctors' for-
merly limitless ability to prescribe medicine were 
unexpectedly successful, cutting government 
medical spending by 2. 7 percent in the first six 
months of the year. ("No Escape," p. 5). Another 
proposal, this one from the CDU, called for the 
introduction of competition into the national 
insurance system as a method of relieving the 
burden on the German government. (Schmid) 
In 1992 Kohl and the CDU proposed that 
workers who take sick leave should not be paid 
on the first day of illness, with the idea that the 
money saved could be used to cover long-term 
nursing care for pensioners. (Murphy) By 1996 
Kohl's government planned to reduce sick pay 
to 80 percent of the basic wage, down from 100 
percent. (Norman, p. 19) It was hoped that 
these and other changes would cut federal gov-
ernment spending by about $16.2 billion the 
next year and reduce spending by the state pen-
sion and health insurance funds by an addi-
tional $12 billion. The federal states, or Lander, 
were also held responsible for cutting another 
$15 billion. (Norman, p. 2) But these moves 
were protested by the powerful unions, who 
were able to effectively stop these plans through 
collective bargaining tactics. Additionally, with 
each welfare reform, it seems that the German 
government wants to include another expan-
sion in benefits. In 1993, along with the pro-
posal to restrict the number of prescriptions 
written by doctors, the government also 
planned to introduce a new nursing care 
scheme for the elderly, meaning that the largest 
reform to the German welfare state in recent 
years actually increased the cost of welfare. 
("No Escape," p. 5) 
A significant part of the problem is the 
strong German identification with their health 
care system. For most Germans the existing 
social insurance system is more than just a use-
ful financial cushion; it is also part of the coun-
try's post-war national identity. (Suzman, p. 2) 
Reform, in order to be effective, will most like-
ly have to be drastic. One controversial proposal 
submitted by employers suggests cutting sick-
ness benefits. Currently benefits include full pay 
for six weeks paid by employers, and then 80 per-
cent of full wages paid by one of the insurance 
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funds. (Suzman, p. 2) The proposal to reduce 
these benefits will save money, but does not 
address the problem of the unemployed. When 
jobless workers get sick, the government still 
carries the full burden of responsibility. 
Another area being targeted for reform is 
the widespread use of spas: health retreats used 
to revitalize tired Germans and promote future 
good health. The German health care system 
is rooted in the idea of preventive medicine. 
Part of the health care package offered to all cit-
izens is the use of these spas for four weeks 
every three years. (Suzman, p. 2) According to 
Alexander Gorbing, marketing director for a spa 
in Bad Neuenahr, the spa system is based on a 
twofold philosophy. First, state pensions 
finance treatment for employed people as a pre-
ventive measure to keep them well enough to 
work until their age of retirement. The second 
half of this philosophy has state health care 
funds being used to keep older people in good 
health so that they do not lobby for more expen-
sive health care. (Cowell) 
In 1996 the CDU proposed that spa bene-
fits be reduced to three weeks every four years. 
This reform would save the government about 
$5 billion a year. In addition, the German gov-
ernment plans to reduce the amount of health 
benefits granted to offset the price of the spas. 
Many Germans take their vacation at these spas 
and enjoy the curative treatments at a state sub-
sidized bargain basement price. Today a state-
subsidized spa guest pays about $8 a day for his 
or her treatment. The CDU wants to double 
that price, a still very generous offer. The mar-
ket value of a spa retreat, according to Rainer 
Mertel, director of Bad Neuenahr's private Spa 
Administration, is closer to $250 a day. (Cowell) 
Although these health care reforms are 
likely to produce significant savings, politicians 
are unwilling to campaign strongly for them. 
One reason is that the unions oppose these 
reforms. Micheale Gottfried, a spokeswoman 
for VDAK Association of Health Insurance 
Funds, which represents seven of the biggest 
public insurers, argues that the reforms "will 
inject free-market economics into a tightly reg-
ulated sphere that has been virtually immune 
to competition. What will emerge is a 'two-
class' system in which coverage is cheaper for 
young and healthy people and costlier for those 
who need it most." (Schmid) The SPD, with its 
strong labor ties, has generally supported the 
union opposition to cuts in health care. The 
CDU is also unwilling to make substantial cuts, 
mainly because of its ties to the elderly. Older 
people are more likely to get sick, and as a result 
are more likely to vote against a party that vows 
to cut health care benefits. 
Pensions 
The existing pension scheme is another 
drain on the welfare state. The CDU has long 
been popular among elderly citizens and has 
been unwilling to propose significant cuts that 
would anger this loyal voting base. As a result 
retired people are very well cared for in 
Germany. Since the reunification, the CDU has 
made great strides in increasing the pensions 
of the former East German citizens, making 
them comparable to those received in the West. 
In 1991 pensions in East Germany were raised 
15 percent, bringing the payments up to over 
70 percent of those workers ' former net 
incomes. (Cornelsen, p. 228) 
While the welfare state may be struggling 
to pay for the elderly now, the future looks even 
more bleak. Germany's baby boom ended in 
1970, earlier than in most other industrialized 
nations. According to Meinhard Meigel and 
Stephanie Wahl of Bonn's Institute for the 
Economy and Society, by the year 2030 the pop-
ulation will fall by at least 15 million people 
(nearly the size of Eastern Germany), unless 
there is a now-unimaginably large increase of 
immigrants. ("No Escape," p. 5) Thirty-eight 
percent of the German population in 2030 are 
likely to be over 60 years old, almost twice the 
proportion today (20 percent). The increased 
welfare-related costs of this older population 
will be paid by a shrinking group ( 46 percent, 
down from the current 60 percent) of econom-
ically productive people. ("Germany: Survey ... ") 
Analysts fear a situation similar to that pre-
dicted for the United States: that in the future 
there will not be enough working age people in 
Germany to provide for the care of the elderly. 
One of the few proposals mentioned for 
reform in this area is the plan to raise the pen-
sionable age for men and women. If imple-
mented, this reform would ease the burden on 
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pension providers but at the same time may 
make it harder for young Germans to secure 
jobs in the future. ("Comment & Analysis ... ," 
p. 19) If this plan takes effect, it is likely that 
employers will be reluctant to promise job secu-
rity into retirement knowing that the cost of 
such promises would be significant. 
The German Electoral System 
Analysts, citizens, and German politicians 
alike agree that the welfare state is in dire need 
of reform. A major obstacle to change, howev-
er, appears to be political reluctance. Elected 
German leaders fear revenge in the ballot box 
for any reform that hurts before it helps. To 
gain an understanding of the politicians' per-
spectives, it is necessary to take a closer look at 
the German electoral system. 
From the U.S. vantage point, one of the 
most unfamiliar aspects of the German politi-
cal system is the country's semi-proportional 
representation electoral system. Germany's 
electoral system is proportional in its results, 
though not in its mechanics. Proportional sys-
tems tend to involve more than two major par-
ties and usually result in coalition govern-
ments. Rather than the "winner take all" 
system the U.S. follows, in a proportional rep-
resentation (PR) system the parliamentary seats 
are divided according to the portion of the votes 
won by each party. One-half of the German par-
liamentary seats are apportioned through the 
PR system, while the rest are distributed 
through "winner take all" district voting. The 
use of a PR system results in more parties being 
represented in the legislature and more voices 
being heard when policies are discussed. Arend 
Lijphart, a political scientist who has exten-
sively studied various electoral systems, believes 
that "policies supported by a broad consensus 
are more likely to be successfully carried out 
and to remain on course than policies imposed 
by a 'strong' government against the wishes of 
important interest groups." (Lijphart, p. 173) 
While in the short run a stronger presidential 
system may appear more effective, Lijphart 
argues that over the long term a PR system is 
the most inclusive electoral system and there-
fore likely to be more effective. 
Germany's electoral system requires that 
parties meet a minimum threshold level, five 
percent, in order to be included in Parliament. 
This threshold can be avoided in the PR half of 
the electoral system if a party wins three dis-
trict seats. As a result, the PDS (the former 
Communist Party of East Germany) received 
4.4 percent of the seats in the last election but 
won more than three district seats. The party 
now holds several dozen seats in Parliament 
through the combination of district voting and 
the PR system. The threshold provision was 
included in the electoral system as a means of 
preventing a recurrence of the fractured poli-
tics of the Weimar Republic, the political 
regime that was followed by the rise of Hitler 
and fascism in Germany. (Ash, p. 22) The fail-
ure of the Weimar Republic is mainly attributed 
to spreading governmental power among too 
many parties. The current system allows for a 
variety of political voices to be heard , but 
requires that a party gain a significant amount 
of support before it becomes a formal member 
of the government. Because no one party holds 
all authority, it is sometimes difficult to make 
drastic changes in policy. This problem is most 
apparent when the country is in an economic 
crisis, a time when drastic moves are often nec-
essary. Despite this criticism analysts argue 
that there is no reason why a consensus-based 
system, such as the one used in Germany, 
should be unsuccessful in difficult economic 
times. As long as it is reasonably flexible, a con-
sensus-based country can overcome obstacles 
by dividing the burden of responsibility among 
several political parties. ("Survey; Germany ... " 
p. 5) If the government can find a way to spread 
the responsibility to all major parties, the prob-
lem of restructuring the welfare state might be 
resolved. Though this is theoretically feasible , 
it appears that German political parties are 
unwilling to share the pain, and instead seem 
united in their goal of avoidance. 
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Conclusion 
Welfare restructuring has become a more 
urgent problem because of Germany's partici-
pation in the European Union. CDU Finance 
Minster Theo Waigel has already admitted that 
the government will find it very difficult to meet 
a key condition for the country to adopt the 
euro: the German overall public debt must not 
exceed 60 percent of GDP. ("SPD Blasts ... ") 
Waigel has supported social welfare spending 
cuts in order to help reduce the public debt, a 
move the SPD has loudly criticized. In May 
1997 German officials revealed a shortfall of 
$10.6 billion in public revenues. (McCathie) 
The welfare system first established by 
Otto von Bismarck in the late 1800s can no 
longer function in the modern era. The 
Germans simply cannot afford the system; both 
their financial and psychological resources are 
heavily drained. If they want to remain com-
petitive in today's world, if they want to enjoy 
the benefits of the euro, Germany must be will-
ing to reduce the size of its welfare state. 
The welfare state is, however, a vital part 
of Germany's government and its history. It has 
functioned as a valuable safety net, providing 
relief for thousands of workers who have suf-
fered the perils of unemployment. The welfare 
state also serves as a safety valve, calming the 
fears of those without work, ensuring that their 
loss of employment does not result in the same 
anger that previously led to Hitler 's rise to 
power. Health care and pension insurance are 
also important to the German people, and 
experts provide a compelling argument for 
restructuring these benefits. It is likely that 
some of the recommended changes could pro-
vide a more efficient use of allocated benefits 
and save the German public billions of marks. 
If reforms are not implemented, however, the 
German government may eventually bankrupt 
its system through its own generosity. 
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